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Abstract
Electrical energy generation and distribution systems are good examples of complex systems.
They include continuous, discrete, and social dynamics. They are operated by millions of
human and non-human (or electro-mechanical) agents, and they show statistical properties
found in other complex systems, such as power-law distributions in failure sizes. A number
of recent large blackouts in Europe and North America have emphasized the societal impor-
tance of understanding these dynamics. Classical electromagnetic analysis alone frequently
does not provide the insight required to characterize and mitigate risks in the electricity
infrastructure. The objective of this thesis is to obtain insights into the dynamics of power
grids using tools from the science of complex systems. In particular, this thesis will compare
the topology, electrical structure, and attack/failure tolerance of power grids with those of
theoretical graph structures such as regular, random, small-world, and scale-free networks.
Simulation results in this thesis will describe the cost of the disturbances as a function of
failure or attack sizes. The cost associated with network perturbations is often measured by
changes on the diameter or average path length, whereas in the electricity industry, the loss
of power demand (or blackout size) is the best indicator of the cost or impact of disturbances
to electricity infrastructure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A number of recent large blackouts in Europe and North America have highlighted the need
for new approaches to the study of electric energy systems. On August 14, 2003, a cascad-
ing failure that spread into eight US states and one Canadian province left approximately
50,000,000 people in the dark, with an economic cost of $2-10 billion (USCA, 2004). One
month later, another blackout affected the majority of citizens of Italy and a good part
of Switzerland. Failures of Italian transportation systems left travelers in the lurch and
resulted in several deaths (UTCE, 2004). Table 1.1 describes the 10 largest North Amer-
ican blackouts (1984-2006) and their causes, as reported by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC).
While there still exists some controversy about the causes of large cascading failures,
their frequency is clearly not decreasing over time (Hines et al., 2009). These potentially
avoidable failures elicit the need for further examination of methods that might provide
insight regarding the vulnerability of power systems. Some other infrastructure networks
(such as water or gas pipes, airlines, or the Internet) have reduced failure frequencies by
improving planning strategies and deploying new technology.
The first research goal of this work addresses this issue by finding a connection between
the structure of power grids and risk probability. This thesis applies mechanisms from the
relatively recent field of complex networks to understand the topology of power grids and
1
Table 1.1: The 10 largest North American blackouts and their causes (1984-2006).
Date Location MW Customers Primary cause
1 14-Aug-2003 East. US, Canada 57,669 15,330,850 Cascading failure
2 13-Mar-1989 Quebec, N. York 19,400 5,828,000* Solar flare, casc.
3 18-Apr-1988 East. US, Canada 18,500 2,800,000 Ice storm
4 10-Aug-1996 Western US 12,500 7,500,000 Cascading failure
5 18-Sep-2003 Southeastern US 10,067 2,590,000 Hurricane Isabel
6 23-Oct-2005 Southeastern US 10,000 3,200,000 Hurricane Wilma
7 27-Sep-1985 Southeastern US 9,956* 2,991,139 Hurricane Gloria
8 29-Aug-2005 Southeastern US 9,652 1,091,057 Hurr. Katrina
9 29-Feb-1984 Western US 7,901 3,159,559 Cascading failure
10 4-Dec-2002 Southeastern US 7,200 1,140,000 Winter storm
(*) Estimated value. Source: (Hines et al., 2009)
describes new metrics in order to better understand the electrical structure of power grids.
These insights should provide further knowledge about large cascading failures probability,
that is to say one of the components to risk.
The second component to risk is cost. Cascading failures sizes have a salient impact in
terms of social costs. Recent research (Carreras et al., 2004; Hines et al., 2009) proposes
that the size of large blackouts fits well to a power-law probability distribution (see Figure
1.1). In other words, the probability of having a costly event is remarkably high. This issue
motivates another research question I want to address in this work: What is the relationship
between the power-law failure statistic and the topological and/or electrical structure of
power grids?
Topology analysis is fundamental not only to better understand the dynamics of net-
works, but also for forecasting operating costs. For instance, recent studies (Blumsack et al.,
2007) have shown that the Braess paradox is applicable to electrical power networks, mean-
ing that the addition of transmission lines to the power grid can increase congestion through
the network (in particular, when the network forms Wheatstone bridges). The same princi-
ple is pertinent for the concept of ‘smart grid’ because better knowledge about topology is
crucial for scaling the corresponding communication systems. For instance, if we are devel-
oping a telecommunications layer in order to connect distant meters, we need to dimension
the bandwidth or the number of routing devices. This is an easier task after synthesizing a
2
!Figure 1.1: Blackout size distribution. Source: Hines et al. (2009).
large number of random power grids to test optimum configurations.
1.1 Research goals
This section formalizes the research goals of this work and outlines how they are addressed
through these chapters.
The first goal is to describe the topology of power grids using a combination of existing
complex networks metrics and accurate power system data. Chapter 2 uses these data to
illustrate how power grids are similar to and differ from other types of networks.
The second goal is to describe the electrical structure of power grids with measures that
are analogous to those used to describe the topology. In support of this goal Chapter 3
provides a new approach to represent the power grid as a complex network, based primarily
on electrical, rather than the topological, structure metrics.
The third goal is to understand how the identified topological and electrical properties
relate to blackout risk in power grids. In particular, Chapter 4 addresses the question of how
3
disturbance cost increases with disturbance size in power grids. The cost associated with
network perturbations is first measured by changes on the diameter or average path length,
following the method proposed in (Albert et al., 2000). After contrasting these results with
those reported in the existing complex systems literature, I focus on electrical risk analysis
and measure the cost by measuring blackout sizes (the amount of power interrupted).
1.2 Related literature
1.2.1 Topological studies of complex networks
One of the early papers in the field of complex networks was the article by Erdos and Renyi
(1959). They introduced the random graph model (ER), generated from an initial set of
disconnected nodes which are linked by edges between randomly chosen pairs of nodes,
which gives random graphs a Poisson-distributed degree distribution. ER graphs have been
extensively studied and many modifications have been proposed in order to fit this model
to real networks (Boccaletti et al., 2006).
Watts and Strogatz (1998) introduced the small-world network model. The WS model
aims to generate graphs that have a high node clustering and present the small-world prop-
erty, i.e. the ability to reach any given point within the network in a fairly small number of
steps relative to the network size. These graphs are generated by rewiring an initial ring of
nodes that are symmetrically connected to their nearest neighbors. With a small number of
these shortcuts, the network acquires small-world properties.
The growth of the World Wide Web inspired Barabasi and Albert (BA, 1999) to create
one of the most comprehensively studied network models. The BA model is a scale-free
network where evolution is represented by growth and preferential attachment of nodes,
whereas a power-law degree distribution gives the scale-free property of the network. Re-
cent generalizations of this model have introduced variations in the degree distribution by
modifying the attachment mechanisms, implementing dynamic edge rewiring, etc. See, for
example, Krapivsky and Redner (2001) for a discussion on attachment kernels. BA graphs
4
are characterized by a higher degree variance when compared to ER graphs.
Random boolean networks have been utilized to simplify genetic models (Kauffman and
Johnsen, 1991; Kauffman et al., 2003), and results have shown that the topologies of these
networks are crucial to the robustness of biological organisms. Because of this structure,
random disturbances cannot grow uncontrollably.
Another good example of biological networks are neural networks, which have inspired
mathematical/computational models. Their structure was first studied by Ramon y Cajal
(1888).
1.2.2 Power grids as complex networks
Recent studies that approach the analysis of power grids as complex networks have yielded
contrasting results. In particular, there has been some controversy about node degree distri-
bution, with researchers reporting exponential (Albert et al., 2004) and power-law (Chassin
and Posse, 2005) functions for the same power grid region. Some other authors (Bompard
et al., 2009; Arianos et al., 2009; Atkins et al., 2009) have introduced new metrics that
extend the topological analysis by characterizing electrical properties of power grids. Table
1.2 summarizes some notable results from the recent literature.
1.2.3 Vulnerability of complex networks
Table 1.3 gives an outline of related studies on vulnerability of complex networks. In par-
ticular, this thesis conforms to the risk analysis model that Albert et al. proposed in (2000).
They reported that scale-free networks exhibit high tolerance to random failures and fragility
with respect to targeted attacks. Figure 1.2 compares those findings with the behavior of
exponential networks under the same experiment.
5
Table 1.2: Complex properties of power grids as reported in existent literature.
Citation Data Results
Amaral et al. (2000) Southern California Edison Exponential d.d.
Albert et al. (2004) US grid Exponential d.d.
Crucitti et al. (2004) Italian power grid Power-law d.d.
Chassin and Posse (2005) US Eastern and Western grids Power-law d.d.
Blumsack et al. (2007) IEEE-118 Tradeoff between congestion and
reliability for Wheatstone
structures.
Wang et al. (2008) IEEE-30/57/118/300,
NY-2935, WSCC
Creation of synthetic power grids
with topology and eigenvalues
similar to standard test systems.
Bompard et al. (2009);
Arianos et al. (2009)
Italian power grid Introduction of net-ability as an
extended topological approach.
Atkins et al. (2009) IEEE-
14/30/57/118/145/162/300
Citywide real grid
Introduction of tree-width
measure for robustness. Power
grids have low tree-width.
* d.d. = degree distribution
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called scale-free networks, which include t e World-Wide Web3–5,
the Internet6, social networks7 and cells8. We find that such
networks display an unexpected degree of robustness, the ability
of their nodes to communicate being unaffected even by un-
realistically high failure rates. However, error tolerance comes at a
high price in that these networks are extremely vulnerable to
attacks (that is, to the selection and removal of a few nodes that
play a vital role in maintaining the network’s connectivity). Such
error tolerance and attack vulnerability are generic properties of
communication networks.
The increasing availability of topological data on large networks,
aided by the computerization of data acquisition, had led to great
advances in our understanding of the generic aspects of network
structure and development9–16. The existing empirical and theo-
retical results indicate that complex networks can be divided into
two major classes based on their connectivity distribution P(k),
giving the probability that a node in the network is connected to k
other nodes. The first class of networks is characterized by a P(k)
that peaks at an average 〈k〉 and decays exponentially for large k. The
most investigated examples of such exponential networks are the
random graph model of Erdo¨s and Re´nyi9,10 and the small-world
model ofWatts and Strogatz11, both leading to a fairly homogeneous
network, in which each node has approximately the same number
of links, k! 〈k〉. In contrast, results on the World-Wide Web
(WWW)3–5, the Internet6 and other large networks17–19 indicate
that many systems belong to a class of inhomogeneous networks,
called scale-free networks, for which P(k) decays as a power-law,
that is PðkÞ"k!g, free of a characteristic scale. Whereas the prob-
ability that a node has a very large number of connections (kq 〈k〉)
is practically prohibited in exponential networks, highly connected
nodes are statistically significant in scale-free networks (Fig. 1).
We start by investigating the robustness of the two basic con-
nectivity distribution models, the Erdo¨s–Re´nyi (ER) model9,10 that
produces a network with an exponential tail, and the scale-free
model17 with a power-law tail. In the ER model we first define theN
nodes, and then connect each pair of nodes with probability p. This
algorithm generates a homogeneous network (Fig. 1), whose con-
nectivity follows a Poisson distribution peaked at 〈k〉 and decaying
exponentially for kq 〈k〉.
The inhomogeneous connectivity distribution of many real net-
works is reproduced by the scale-free model17,18 that incorporates
two ingredients common to real networks: growth and preferential
attachment. The model starts with m0 nodes. At every time step t a
new node is introduced, which is connected to m of the already-
existing nodes. The probability Πi that the new node is connected
to node i depends on the connectivity ki of node i such that
Πi ¼ ki=Sjkj. For large t the connectivity distribution is a power-
law following PðkÞ ¼ 2m2=k3.
The interconnectedness of a network is described by its diameter
d, defined as the average length of the shortest paths betwee any
two nodes in the network. The diameter characterizes the ability of
two nodes to communicate with each other: the smaller d is, the
shorter is the expected path between them. Networks with a very
large number of nodes can have quite a small diameter; for example,
the diameter of the WWW, with over 800 million nodes20, is around
19 (ref. 3), whereas social networks with over six billion individuals
Exponential Scale-free
ba
Figure 1 Visual illustration of the difference between an exponential and a scale-free
network. a, The exponential network is homogeneous: most nodes have approximately
the same number of links. b, The scale-free network is inhomogeneous: the majority of
the nodes have one or two links but a few nodes have a large number of links,
guaranteeing that the system is fully connected. Red, the five nodes with the highest
number of links; green, their first neighbours. Although in the exponential network only
27% of the nodes are reached by the five most connected nodes, in the scale-free
network more than 60% are reached, demonstrating the importance of the connected
nodes in the scale-free network Both networks contain 130 nodes and 215 links
(〈k 〉 ¼ 3:3). The network visualization was done using the Pajek program for large
network analysis: 〈http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/pajekman.htm〉.
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Figure 2 Changes in the diameter d of the network as a function of the fraction f of the
removed nodes. a, Comparison between the exponential (E) and scale-free (SF) network
models, each containing N ¼ 10;000 nodes and 20,000 links (that is, 〈k 〉 ¼ 4). The blue
symbols correspond to the diameter of the exponential (triangles) and the scale-free
(squares) networks when a fraction f of the nodes are removed randomly (error tolerance).
Red symbols show the response of the exponential (diamonds) and the scale-free (circles)
networks to attacks, when the most connected nodes are removed. We determined the f
dependence of the diameter for different system sizes (N ¼ 1;000; 5,000; 20,000) and
found that the obtained curves, apart from a logarithmic size correction, overlap with
those shown in a, indicating that the results are independent of the size of the system. We
note that the diameter of the unperturbed (f ¼ 0) scale-free network is smaller than that
of the exponential network, indicating that scale-free networks use the links available to
them more efficiently, generating a more interconnected web. b, The changes in the
diameter of the Internet under random failures (squares) or attacks (circles). We used the
topological map of the Internet, containing 6,209 nodes and 12,200 links (〈k 〉 ¼ 3:4),
collected by the National Laboratory for Applied Network Research 〈http://moat.nlanr.net/
Routing/rawdata/〉. c, Error (squares) and attack (circles) survivability of the World-Wide
Web, measured on a sample containing 325,729 nodes and 1,498,353 links3, such that
〈k 〉 ¼ 4:59.
© 2000 Macmillan Magazines Ltd
Figure 1.2: Albert et al. (2000) vulnerability analysis results. Y-axes represent the diameter
of the network (d) as a function of the fraction of the removed nodes (f). Subgraph a shows
how exponential networks b have similarly und r simulated failur s and attacks (triangles
and diamonds) whereas scale-free networks are robust against random failures (squares)
yet fragile against degree b sed attack (circles). Subgraphs b and c illustrate scale-free
behavior with examples of real networks: Internet and the WWW.
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Table 1.3: Related studies on vulnerability of complex networks.
Citation Data Results
Albert et al. (2000) Exponential and scale-free
networks
Scale-free networks present high
tolerance to random failures.
Holme and Kim (2002) Los Alamos collaboration
network
NLANR* computer network
Highlight the importance of
recalculating attack strategies.
Robustness of server-less
networks.
Holmgren (2006); Holmgren
and Molin (2006)
Nordic grid and Western US grid Power grids and scale-free
networks present similar
disintegration patterns
Watts (2002) Arbitrary random graphs Cascading failures present
power-law or bimodal
distributions
Dodds and Watts (2005) SIS/SIRS/SIR contagion models Model parameters define the
threshold of their contagion
cascading bimodal distributions
*NLANR = National Laboratory for Applied Network Research
1.3 Data
The North American power grid is among the most complex engineered systems of the
modern era. It serves more than 300 million people; it has more than 200 thousand miles of
transmission lines; and it is operated by millions of agents (human and non-human). The
electrical infrastructure of the United States and Canada is divided into four main sub-grids
(see Figure 1.3): the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, the Québec
Interconnection and the ERCOT Interconnection (a.k.a. Texas Interconnection).
The data I use in this thesis to represent the North American power grid comes from a
NERC planning model of the Eastern Interconnection (EI) for 2012. The NERC planning
models are known as MMWG (Multiregional Modeling Working Group) cases, and are
classified as “Critical Energy Infrastructure Information” by the US Department of Energy.
The author has permission to use these data for this research. In order to compare results
with a standard test system, I use the IEEE-300 bus case (PSTCA, 2007), which topology
can be seen in Figure 1.4. Table 1.4 summarizes the sizes of these systems. It is important
to mention that for most of the analysis in this thesis, and unless otherwise stated, I have
used the network that results from removing isolated buses and parallel branches.
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Figure 1.3: North American power grid. Source: NERC.
Figure 1.4: Topology of the IEEE-300 bus case.
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Table 1.4: Summarized statistics of data used in this thesis.
Case data Eastern
Interconnection
IEEE-300
Total buses 49907 300
Total buses
(no isolates)
49597 300
Total branches 66463 411
Total branches
(no parallel)
62985 409
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Chapter 2
Structural properties
of power grids
This chapter provides a topological analysis of the Eastern Interconnection and the IEEE-300
power grids. As discussed in Chapter 1, recent studies in fields like biology or transportation
have shown that the structure of a network can provide information about performance
without detailed dynamical models. To represent the power grid as a complex network we
build an unweighted and undirected graph composed of nodes and edges. Using metrics from
graph theory and modern complex networks analysis, the results in this chapter provide
insight into the properties of power grids, considering only topological information. In
summary, the goal of this chapter is to characterize the topological structure of the Eastern
US power grid and highlight implications for the performance of electricity infrastructures.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 introduces methods for generating the
test networks utilized in this work. The first set of algorithms is based upon common graph
models from the complex systems literature and I also introduce new algorithms which have
the intention of achieving a better matching of the properties of power grids. Section 2.2
describes the chosen set of metrics which will indicate how the proposed graphs resemble
(or not) electricity networks. Section 2.3 comprises the set of results obtained by combining
the data and metrics described in the two previous sections. Finally, Section 2.4 assesses
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the validity of the results obtained in this chapter and summarizes ways in which they can
improve the characterization of electricity networks.
2.1 Network structures
This section describes how undirected graphs can model the topology of power grids. In
order to draw an analogy between power grids and other network structures reported in
the literature, I detail the generating algorithms followed in each case and introduce a new
method to create graphs that reveals similar properties to those obtained from power grids.
2.1.1 Modeling power grids as undirected graphs
An undirected network is formally defined in graph theory (Bollobas, 1998) as a pair of sets
G = {N, M} such that |N | = n is the number of nodes and |M | = m is the number of
edges. The adjacency matrix A uniquely represents the configuration of the graph, such
that aij = 1 if and only if there is an edge between nodes i and j. For a simple undirected
graph, A is symmetric, with zeros on the diagonal, representing the absence of self loops.
In order to study power grids with this model, some simplifications are necessary. In the
undirected graphs each node represents a bus. It is important to note that in the physical
grid, these buses can have different electrical properties, however in this chapter, nodes are
assumed to be homogeneous. This model ignores whether generators, loads, transformers, or
transmission lines connect to the bus. In the same way, all transmission lines are modeled
as edges with equal weight. Physical length and electrical impedance are ignored in the
undirected graph representation.
Some of the metrics evaluated in this chapter require the use of a graph distance matrix,
D. D has the same dimensions as the adjacency matrix (A). dij indicates the minimum
number of edges that one crosses to traverse from node i to node j. D is also known as the
geodesic distance matrix (Boccaletti et al., 2006). When there are no paths between i and
j, dij = 0.
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Figure 2.1: Topology for a 300 node random (ER) graph, used for comparison with power
grids in this chapter.
2.1.2 Random graphs (ER)
In this chapter, random graphs are created following the standard algorithm described in
Erdos and Renyi (1959) and Albert et al. (2000) for a given number of nodes and edges
such that they are comparable to the power grids under study: Eastern Interconnection and
IEEE-300. In the random graph (ER) model every edge is generated by randomly selecting
endpoints from a uniform distribution. Figure 2.1 shows the topology of the 300 node ER
graph used in this chapter.
2.1.3 Small-world (WS)
One of the most well known studies on small-world graphs (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) de-
scribed power grids as an example of a small-world network. In order to verify whether or
not power grids resemble the properties of WS graphs we introduce slight modifications to
the WS algorithm and produce a graph of size (n,m). In particular, we tune the probability
of rewiring so that the resulting graph diameter is similar to those obtained from the real
data sets (Eastern Interconnection and IEEE-300). Algorithm 1 details the process. This
algorithm produces networks with topologies similar to those in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Topology for a 300 node WS graph, used for comparison with power grids in
this chapter.
Algorithm 1: Modified small-world graph algorithm
Input: Desired nodes (n), desired edges (m) such that n <= m <= 2n
// generate regular lattice with n nodes and approximately m edges
for i = 1 to n do
create a new node
create first edge to adjacent neighbor
create additional edge to second neighbor with probability m/n - 1
end
// modify rewiring probability to match diameters
while diameter != diameter from same size power grid graph do
rewire edge
end
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2.1.4 Preferential attachment (PA)
Notwithstanding the fact that the original algorithm to generate scale-free graphs was first
proposed by Simon (1955), the main reference for this family of graphs is the model de-
scribed by Barabasi and Albert (1999). For this analysis, I want to produce a synthetic
PA graph with size (n,m) in order to compare it with the EI and IEEE-300 models. The
original Barabasi and Albert algorithm is slightly modified in order to match the desired
network sizes. Algorithm 2 describes these modifications. Because every iteration generates
a new node and approximately m/n edges, the result is a graph with n nodes and roughly
m edges. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a 300 node PA graph.
Algorithm 2: Modified preferential attachment graph algorithm
Input: Desired nodes (n), desired edges (m)
// Create n nodes and approximately m edges
for i = 1 to n do
create a new node
select an existing node using roulette wheel method and attachment probabilities
proportional to node degree create edge between new node and selected existing
node
create additional edge with probability m/n - 1
end
2.1.5 Minimum-distance graph
The goal of this subsection is to create algorithms that can generate undirected graphs
with the properties of known power grids. Some authors have emphasized the benefits
of generating random power grids (Wang et al., 2008). In particular, a large number of
randomly generated electrical grid models with appropriate size can be especially useful for:
1. Testing control, operation or planning tools.
2. Running sensitivity analysis for metrics of interest.
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Figure 2.3: Topology for a 300 node PA graph, used for comparison with power grids in
this chapter.
3. Describing possible scaling issues by contrasting metrics against different network sizes.
The main difference between the method proposed here and those within the existing litera-
ture is that this algorithm considers the costs of distance and the evolutionary dynamics of
power grids. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show 300 node graphs generated from two different versions
of the minimum-distance graph algorithm. Section 2.1.5.1 describes the simplest version of
the algorithm and Section 2.1.5.2 describes the one-parameter version of the algorithm where
the cost of bisecting transmission lines is considered.
2.1.5.1 Simple minimum-distance graph
The following algorithm can be used to generate minimum distance graphs. Let Ma be the
set of neighboring nodes for node a.
• For a = 1 : n
1. Randomly generate planar coordinates for a (xa, ya) from a uniform distribution
2. Generate approximately floor(m/n) edges (a → b) by iteratively selecting b to
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minimize the Euclidean distance between a and b.
min
b
(xa − xb)2 + (ya − yb)2 (2.1)
s.t. b /∈Ma
3. Generate one additional edge from Eq. 2.1 with probability P = m/n−floor(m/n).
2.1.5.2 Minimum-distance graph with bisection
As further discussed in Section 2.3.3 the simple minimum-distance graph does not character-
ize all of the considered properties of power grids, therefore this section describes a revised
version that improves the attachment kernel described above by considering a bisection cost
cb. New nodes can either be connected to an existing node through a new edge, or it can
be placed near and existing edge, and become a bisecting node for that edge. Consider for
example the construction of a new town that needs to connect to the power grid. The town
can either be connected via a transmission line or feeder to an existing substation, or a new
substation could be built, bisecting an existing transmission line. With this modification,
the min-dist selection criteria (Eq. 2.1) is modified slightly as follows:
min (C1, C2)
s.t. C1 = min
b/∈Ma
(xa − xb)2 + (ya − yb)2 (2.2)
C2 = min
i∈{1...m}
d(a→ ei) + cb
where d(a→ ei) is the distance between point a and the nearest point along line segment ei,
and cb is an exogenously selected bisection cost. If C1 is lesser, then the algorithm creates
a new edge a→ b. If C2 is lesser then the new node bisects the existing edge ei.
2.2 Metrics
This section describes the metrics that I use to characterize the topological structure of the
networks introduced in Section 2.1. The selection of these specific measures is justified by
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Figure 2.4: Topology for a 300 node simple minimum-distance graph (Eq 2.1)
Figure 2.5: Topology for a 300 node minimum-distance graph with bisection (Eq 2.2)
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the existing related literature, with the purpose of providing homogeneous comparison of
results between power grids and other types of network structures.
2.2.1 Degree distribution
The degree of a node indicates the number of nodes adjacent to that node. One can also
define the degree of node i in terms of the adjacency matrix as the sum of the elements of
the corresponding row (or column since A is symmetric):
ki =
N∑
j=1
aij (2.3)
The degree distribution (p.m.f. of degree) is a useful way to represent the global connectivity
of a network. The first and second statistical moments of this distribution provide the aver-
age number of connections per node and the variance. However, for some distributions such
as power-laws, these statistical moments do not provide a realistic representation because
the degree varies over several orders of magnitude. In this case it is useful to visualize the
parameters of the probability mass function for areas of interest, such as in the tail. For in-
stance, two networks can have similar average degree, but dramatically different dynamical
behavior, resulting from the presence of high degree nodes (hubs). See, for example, Albert
and Barabasi (2002) or Boccaletti et al. (2006) for a discussion of how degree distribution
affects the mechanics of networks.
2.2.2 Clustering coefficient
The clustering coefficient, C, is a common metric that provides information about the tran-
sitivity of a network; i.e., if two pairs of nodes, {x, y} and {y, z}, are clustered then there
also exists an edge between nodes x and z. In social networks, the clustering coefficient
indicates whether two individuals with a common friend may also know each other. In that
case they would form a cluster. C is defined as follows in terms of the coefficient ci or the
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individual clustering coefficient for each node (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
C =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci (2.4)
where the individual clustering coefficient, ci, is defined as
ci =
ei
(ki(ki − 1))/2 (2.5)
and ei is the number of edges within the cluster of nodes including node i and its immediate
neighbors Ni:
ei =
∑
∀j,k∈{Ni∪i}
ajk/2 (2.6)
2.2.3 Average shortest path and diameter
The average shortest path (or characteristic path length), L, is a way of measuring the
‘small-world’ property of networks, which consists of the existence of a short path between
any given pair of nodes relative to the size of the network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). This
property has been studied for many real networks. For example, Kochen et al. (1989) found
that on average, two random people in the US could communicate by establishing a path
of just six degrees of separation. L is defined from the distance matrix as the average value
of all the possible geodesic entries for every combination of nodes, given that the geodesic
entry dij is the number of edges along the shortest path from i to j.
L =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
∀i,j
i$=j
dij (2.7)
Often some dij are infinite because there are unconnected components. In this case it is useful
to consider only the distances among the nodes within the largest connected component (or
the “giant component”). The diameter of a network is the maximum value among all the
average shortest path lengths.
dmax = max
ij
dij (2.8)
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2.2.4 Assortativity
In complex networks, the assortativity coefficient, r, describes the extent to which nodes tend
to attach to nodes with similar degree. Although assortativity can be used to measure other
similarities in networks, it is most commonly measured with respect to the node degree. The
assortativity of the network directly influences the size of the giant component (Newman,
2002) and therefore the assortativity coefficient helps one to understand macro behaviors
such as contagion phenomena or network resilience. In order to compare different networks,
I use in this study the normalized form for r which is equivalent to the Pearson correlation
coefficient for the degree of node pairs (Newman, 2002, 2003).
r =
M−1
∑
i jiki −
[
M−1
∑
i
1
2(ji + ki)
]2
M−1
∑
i
1
2(j
2
i + k
2
i )−
[
M−1
∑
i
1
2(ji + ki)
]2 (2.9)
where m is the number of links in the network and ji/ki are the degrees of the endpoints
of link i. Accordingly, a network with assortativity coefficient of 1 would be completely
assortative (i.e., hubs only connect to hubs) while a coefficient of -1 comes from a completely
disassortative network. r is zero for a network with no assortative mixing.
2.3 Results
After modifying the Eastern Interconnection data introduced in Section 1.3 with the sim-
plifications noted in Section 2.1.1, the result is a network with |N | = 49597 nodes and
|M | = 62985 edges. In this section, the metrics calculated for these data will be compared
against similarly sized, randomly generated graphs from the previously introduced models.
2.3.1 Degree distribution
In the text that follows I review a method to fit the distribution to a power law as described
by Clauset et al. (2007). A discrete power law probability distribution follows the equation
p(x) = P(X = x) = Cx−α (2.10)
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Figure 2.6: The degree distribution (ccdf) of the Eastern Interconnect. Solid line represents
a power-law fit calculated with the method discussed in Section 2.3.1 (with parameters
α = 3.26 and xmin = 4 ). Dashed line represents a least squares exponential fit with rate
parameter λ = 0.54.
where α is the exponent or scaling factor. A convenient way of visualizing the degree
distribution is working with the complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf).
Figure 2.6 shows the degree distribution of the EI on a log-log graph as a ccdf.
The majority of empirical distributions hold a power law for values higher than a certain
threshold (a.k.a. power law tail). Hence the power law fitting problem basically consists in
finding the two parameters: α and xmin. The fact that the degree distribution is discrete
presents some difficulties respect to the continuous scenario, as it is the case among other
common statistical distributions. In particular, the appropriate value for C would be
C =
1
ζ(α, xmin)
(2.11)
hence some approximations are convenient in order to facilitate these calculations. Equa-
tion 2.12 computes the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the scaling parameter for
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Table 2.1: Power-law fit parameters.
Network Eastern Interconnection IEEE300
α 3.26 3.5
xmin 4 3
D∗ 0.067 0.052
*Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test statistic (Eq. 2.14).
the discrete case when one has a discrete integer variable and xmin > 1.
ζ ′(αˆ,xmin)
ζ(αˆ,xmin)
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
lnxi (2.12)
To avoid the extensive numerical analysis required to evaluate this transcendental equation
in generalized zeta functions, one can approximate it with equation 2.13, where we assume
that true integers (node degree) can be represented as continuous reals rounded to the
nearest integer. This method yields quite good results for xmin not excessively small.
αˆ $ 1 + n
[
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin − 12
]−1
(2.13)
There are many different methods to calculate the lower bound for the power law. xmin can
be found by inspection by choosing x such that lower values almost describe a horizontal
line. Here I calculate xmin using binary search and comparing the resulting distribution
with the best-fit power law model above xˆmin. I perform this comparison by utilizing the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (or KS statistic) described by Press et al. (1992). This statistic
will also validate the final results after obtaining both parameters α and xmin, comparing
the distance between the empirical distribution and the calculated fit.
D = max
x≥xmin
|S(x)− P (x)| (2.14)
The calculated parameters for the power law fit of the degree distributions using the method
described above are summarized in Table 2.1.
A value of p < 0.001 and inspection of Figure 2.6 indicate that the degree distribution of
the EI model is not likely to hold the power law hypothesis. Only low degree nodes actually
match the power law slope, plus the empirical data clearly show an exponential cutoff for
the tail.
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Figure 2.7: The degree distribution (ccdf) of 300 node graphs. Minimum-distance v1 corre-
sponds to the simple minimum distance algorithm as described in Section 2.1.5.1. Minimum-
distance v2 corresponds to the algorithm described in Section 2.1.5.2 which incorporates a
bisection cost parameter.
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Figure 2.8: The degree distribution (ccdf) of 49597 node graphs. Minimum-distance
v1 corresponds to the simple minimum distance algorithm as described in Section 2.1.5.1.
Minimum-distance v2 corresponds to the algorithm described in Section 2.1.5.2 which in-
corporates a bisection cost parameter.
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Table 2.2: Topological metrics for the Eastern Interconnection and similar sized random,
small-world and preferential attachment networks.
Network Eastern
Interconnect
Random Small world
p = 0.0882
Preferential
attachment
Nodes 49597 49597 49597 49597
Edges 62985 62985 62906 62966
< k > 2.54 2.54 2.54 2.54
max(k) 27 13 6 391
C 0.071 0.000038 0.267 0.00062
L 35.82 11.29 36.64 7.16
dmax 96 26 96 18
r -0.1062 -0.0012 0.1194 -0.0242
Table 2.3: Topological metrics for the IEEE-300 and similar sized random, small-world
and preferential attachment networks.
Network IEEE-300 Random Small world
p = 0.08
Preferential
attachment
Nodes 300 300 300 300
Edges 409 409 402 409
< k > 2.73 2.73 2.68 2.73
max(k) 11 7 6 32
C 0.1112 0.0077 0.2627 0.0082
L 9.94 5.67 9.58 4.35
dmax 24 12 24 9
r -0.2206 0.0443 0.0343 -0.1935
2.3.2 Clustering coefficient, average shortest path and diameter
As noted in previous sections, Table 2.2 shows the calculated topological metrics for the
Eastern Interconnection versus similarly sized random, preferential attachment and small
world networks (Erdos and Renyi, 1959; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Barabasi and Albert,
1999).
One can see that the average degree remains constant through the three cases while
the maximum degree varies depending on the model, e.g. for the scale free network, a low
number of nodes will have a very high degree. However, it is important to highlight three
main differences between the power grid and the theoretical networks:
1. The clustering coefficient for the Eastern Interconnect is much larger than equivalent
random and scale free networks. To show this more clearly, Figure 2.9 plots ci as
25
!"!!#$
!"!#!$
!"#!!$
#$ #!$
c
lu
s
te
ri
n
g
 c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t!
degree!
Figure 2.9: Node clustering coefficient (ci) versus degree (k) for the Eastern Interconnec-
tion.
a function of node degree. As the degree increases, the clustering coefficient decays,
indicating that nodes with low degree are much more likely to form clusters than hubs.
2. Average path length and diameter values indicate that the global connectivity of the
power grid is small when compared with random or scale free networks. The existence
of hubs in the scale free model, on the Internet for example, improves the connectivity
and therefore paths tend to be shorter by connecting through these high degree nodes.
On the other hand, the random network also takes advantage of the ergodic attachment
by possibly creating shorter paths among nodes that otherwise would be physically
distant.
3. Assortativity mixing of power grids is weak. For the majority of cases r is a small
negative number but we can not conclude that power grids are disassortative. In
general, nodes do not tend to connect to other nodes as a function of their degree.
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Table 2.4: Properties of minimum-distance 300 node graphs with different values of cb.
cb 0.015 0.025 0.05 0.1 IEEE 300
bisections 100 64 19 2 -
max(k) 7 8 12 11 11
C 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.11
L 10.26 9.92 8.68 7.03 9.94
dmax 23 24 20 17 24
r 0.1289 0.1161 0.1119 0.0237 -0.2206
Table 2.5: Properties of minimum-distance 49597 node graphs with different values of cb.
cb 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.025 0.05 0.1 Eastern Inter-
connection
bisections 17650 2095 1031 902 259 95 29 7 -
max(k) 9 13 14 14 16 17 17 19 27
C 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.071
L 132 51 38.1 34.4 24.24 19.29 19.29 15.36 35.82
dmax 340 135 93 83 59 44 44 37 96
r 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 -0.11
2.3.3 Properties of minimum-distance graphs
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the calculated topological metrics for minimum-distance graphs with
the sizes of the Eastern Interconnection and IEEE-300. Clustering coefficients are fairly high,
as found in ER and WS graphs. Furthermore, clustering coefficients do not present high
sensitivity to different network sizes. Characteristic path lengths appear to scale linearly
with n, rather than logarithmically, as we can measure in power grids, in particular after
introducing the bisection cost.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I presented a number of results that characterize the topology of power
grids. These results indicate that power grids differ substantially from common theoretical
graph structures. In particular, we have shown that random, small world and preferential
attachment graphs are not good models for studying power grids.
Minimum-distance graphs exhibit properties that are similar to those that we find in
power grids. They might be useful in future work to synthesize random power grids of
27
arbitrary sizes.
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Chapter 3
Electrical properties of power grids
Chapter 2 describes the topology of power grids in a manner that is similar to existing
studies of another complex networks. However the topology analysis ignores the electrical
properties of power grids and we need to introduce new metrics that capture the electrical
structure.
Academic research citation networks are a good example of social interactions (Newman,
2003). These complex networks can be characterized by topological analysis. Imagine how
difficult it would be to predict coauthorships if we had to model neural interactions in
order to understand academic citations. On the other hand, power grids and some other
infrastructure networks are governed by relatively simple physical laws that influence the
salience of individual nodes and the interactions among nodes.
The goal of this chapter is to describe the tools that I use to measure electrical prop-
erties and compare the electrical and topological structure in order to fully understand the
structure of power grids.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces the concept of electrical
distance matrix. Section 3.2 describes how to create undirected and unweighted graphs
which are derived from electrical distance measures in order to compare them with the
topology structures studied in Chapter 2. Section 3.3 comprises the set of results obtained
by applying the topological metrics seen in Chapter 2 to the new electrical structures defined
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here. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the results in this chapter and compares them to those
obtained within the topological approach adopted in Chapter 2.
3.1 Electrical distance matrix
In this section I review a method to characterize electrical structure as described by Hines
and Blumsack (2008). The electrical distance matrix E is a simple way of measuring the
electrical connectedness of nodes within a power system. Equation 3.1 defines E as the
absolute value of the inverse of the system admittance matrix.
E = |Y−1| (3.1)
In order to obtain a node degree equivalent measure, Eq. 3.2 defines the characteristic
electrical distance for each node. This value represents the sensitivity between voltage and
current changes for node a and respect to every other node in the network.
ea =
n∑
b=1
b$=a
eab
n− 1 (3.2)
And by inverting the electrical distance one can obtain an expression for electrical centrality:
ca =
1
ea
(3.3)
3.2 Reduced electrical distance matrix
As proposed by Hines et al. (2010), the reduced electrical distance matrix R is a way of
adapting E in such a way that the resulting graph is equivalent in size to its topological
representation. The m edges are replaced with the m smallest entries in the upper (or
lower) triangle of E. Thus the result is a graph with size {n,m} and edges representing
strong electrical connections rather than direct physical connections. R can be constructed
following Eq. 3.4:
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R :

rab = 1 ∀eab < t
rab = 0 ∀eab ! t
(3.4)
where the adjacency threshold t is a given parameter in order to obtain the proper number
of edges.
3.3 Results
After calculating the R matrix for the Eastern Interconnection data, we show in this section
how the topological metrics studied in Chapter 2 can also measure the properties of this
electrically cohesive network structure.
Table 3.1 summarizes the calculated metrics for the Eastern Interconnection R matrix.
One can see that there are nodes with a very high degree. Clustering coefficient is also
relatively high respect to the value obtained from the equivalent topological network. Both
average shortest path (L) and diameter (dmax) hold low values indicating a strong electrical
connectedness.
A fairly negative assortativity coefficient elicits another important difference of this struc-
ture with respect to the corresponding EI adjacency matrix. r indicates that this network
is very disassortative. Figure 3.1 shows the layout of the Eastern Interconnection R matrix
and one can see that a decent amount of nodes linked to a highly cohesive core of the network
is also connected to nodes with lower degree.
3.3.1 Degree distribution
This section describes the degree distribution of the Eastern Interconnection R matrix.
Following the method discussed in Section 2.3.1 to fit the degree distribution to a power-
law, we obtained the parameters on Table 3.2. Figure 3.2 illustrates this result. One can
conclude from the p-value that we cannot reject the power-law degree distribution hypothesis
for this network.
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Table 3.1: Topologically equivalent metrics for the EI reduced electrical distance matrix.
Network EI reduced
electrical distance matrix*
Nodes 1558 (48039 isolates)
Edges 62984
< k > 2.54
max(k) 1473
C 0.65
L 1.97
dmax 3
r -0.51
(*) Metrics are calculated considering the giant component of this network
Figure 3.1: Reduced electrical distance matrix layout for EI
Table 3.2: Power-law fit parameters for the Eastern Interconnection R matrix degree
distribution.
Network EI R
α 3.5
xmin 362
p 0.53
D∗ 0.064
*Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test statistic (Eq. 2.14).
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Figure 3.2: Degree distribution for the Eastern Interconnection R matrix. Solid line repre-
sents a power-law fit calculated with the method discussed in Section 2.3.1 (with parameters
α = 3.5 and xmin = 362 ).
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3.3.2 Differences between D and E
Figure 3.3 illustrates the relationship between topological and electrical distance for the
nodes of the Eastern Interconnection. Each point of the scatter plot gives the average
distances (topological and electrical) between one given node and the rest of the network.
We can observe significant differences as a function of the node nominal voltage. Nodes up
to 115kV show a very large variance within their values for d and e whereas higher voltage
nodes tend to form clusters. For example, 765kV nodes are organized in two different clusters
and one of them shows an interesting distribution of topological distances while keeping a
fairly constant and low electrical distance.
Figure 3.4 shows another method of comparing topological and electrical distances within
the Eastern Interconnection. I plot the distribution of normalized distances (ccdf) obtained
from theD and E matrices. One can see that the topological distance distribution is smooth
and it has an exponential tail, however, the electrical distance distribution elicits a power-
law shaped curve. This latter region has a scaling parameter α = 3.8 and the power-law fit is
valid for distances roughly between e = 0.2 and e = 0.8. The power-law fit exhibits a steep
slope, and therefore we can not obtain strong conclusions about the statistical properties
of this distribution, however we can observe again that the electrical distance distribution
does differ from the topological distance distribution within a large amount of data points.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I presented a new approach to characterize the electrical properties of power
grids. We are able to construct electrical structures that can be measured with the same tools
that those utilized to measure undirected and unweighed graphs. This metric homogeneity
allows a better understanding of the differences between topological and electrical distances.
These two properties present a different correlation depending on the specific electrical
properties of a given node.
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Figure 3.3: Topological distance versus electrical distance
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Figure 3.4: Distributions of topological and electrical distances. Solid line represents a
power-law fit calculated with the method discussed in Section 2.3.1 (with parameters α = 3.8
and xmin = 0.19 ).
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Chapter 4
Risk analysis
This chapter provides a vulnerability assessment of the IEEE-300 and Eastern Interconnec-
tion networks.
For the latter case, we extract 29 subgrids that range in sizes from 300 to 1500 nodes.
Table 4.1 summarizes the number of nodes for each of the analyzed areas. For security
purposes, the tables and figures in the following sections do not reflect real area numbers
and the order is arbitrary.
Risk analysis for the mentioned datasets is performed following two methods. The first
method (Section 4.1) measures the cost associated with network perturbations as a change
in the average path length. Albert et al. (2000) proposed this topological model for attacks
and failures and recently other authors have reported results for power grids following the
original algorithm or similar strategies (Holmgren, 2007; Arianos et al., 2009). The second
method (Section 4.2) incorporates a DC load flow model in order to measure the sizes of
blackouts resulting from random failures and directed attacks.
4.1 Topological risk analysis
The method described in this section follows the random failure and directed attack model
proposed by Albert et al. (2000) and incorporates a new attack approach, consisting of the
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Table 4.1: Summary of the EI areas subset
Number Nodes Number Nodes Number Nodes
1 710 11 734 21 1107
2 1459 12 1104 22 652
3 545 13 410 23 1202
4 517 14 1051 24 315
5 489 15 1365 25 760
6 455 16 618 26 383
7 490 17 766 27 503
8 996 18 1086 28 486
9 1418 19 1066 29 569
10 562 20 344
selection of nodes based on their electrical centrality (Eq. 3.3). For the three scenarios,
the algorithm performs a sequential removal of nodes, one per iteration, and up to a small
fraction of the total amount of nodes in the network. After every iteration, we measure the
average shortest path length (Eq. 2.7). The removal of a node results in the elimination of
all its converging edges. The three strategies for node removal are summarized as follows:
• Random failures: Nodes are drawn from a uniform random distribution. This approach
simulates a failure (or unintelligent attack) to a substation.
• Degree based attacks: Nodes are targeted depending on their degree. This strategy
represents an intelligent attack that would consider the number of transmission lines
connected to a substation.
• Electrical centrality based attacks: Nodes are selected as a function of their electrical
centrality (Eq. 3.3). This approach simulates an intelligent attack that might use
electrical data; e.g., a cyber attack.
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Figure 4.1: Topological risk analysis results for IEEE-300. Note that the random failure
data points represent 20 repetitions. Percentiles 25, 50 and 75 are plotted in the figure.
4.1.1 IEEE-300
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the average shortest path length changes after every iteration of
node removal in the IEEE-300 network. The three methods show a fairly similar relationship
between disturbance size (node removal) and disturbance impact (L). After the 10th node
the average shortest path reaches values around L=10 for the three different strategies.
4.1.2 Eastern Interconnection
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the average shortest path length changes for the Eastern Inter-
connection set of 29 subgrids. As we saw in Section 4.1.1, again the three strategies show
a very similar relationship between disturbance size (node removal) and disturbance impact
(L). Because we are considering a larger number of subgrids in this section, Figures 4.3,4.4
and 4.5 summarize the statistics for each one of the three approaches.
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Figure 4.2: Topological risk analysis results for the Eastern Interconnection. Data points
are averaged over 29 subgrids. Note that the random failure data points represent 20 repe-
titions.
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Figure 4.3: Topological risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Random Failures
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Figure 4.4: Topological risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Node degree based attacks
41
0 2 4 6 8 10 128
10
12
14
16
18
20
Number of nodes removed
Di
st
ur
ba
nc
e 
co
st
 (L
 −
 a
ve
ra
ge
 p
at
h 
le
ng
th
)
←  median
←  mean
←  5%
←  25%
←  75%9
Figure 4.5: Topological risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Electrical centrality based
attacks
4.2 Electrical risk analysis
In the field of power engineering, the problem of solving the power flow equations for large
systems is a computationally expensive task. The DC power flow algorithm uses a simpli-
fication of the non-linear AC power flow equations. We can express the power supply and
demand as a function of the system admittance matrix and a vector with the voltages at
each node:
S(SG,SD) = V & (YV)∗ (4.1)
One can rewrite Eq. 4.1 using the polar form of the voltages vector and obtain the following
set of equations corresponding to real and reactive power respectively:
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Pi = '(Si) = |Vi|
n∑
j=1
(gij |Vj | cos(θi − θj) + bij |Vj | sin(θi − θj)) (4.2)
Qi = ((Si) = |Vi|
n∑
j=1
(gij |Vj | sin(θi − θj)− bij |Vj | cos(θi − θj)) (4.3)
where gij and bij are the real and imaginary parts of theY bus elements (yij). Since bij ) gij
it is often reasonable to assume gij = 0. Furthermore, we may assume that |Vi| = 1.0 ∀i.
With these assumptions, Eq. 4.2 becomes:
Pi =
n∑
j=1
bij sin(θi − θj) (4.4)
Assuming that sin(θi − θj) is small, we can approximate the sine function, which gives:
Pi =
n∑
j=1
bij(θi − θj) (4.5)
4.2.1 IEEE-300
Figure 4.6 describes the electrical risk analysis for the IEEE-300 network. One can see that
this specific topology is more vulnerable to degree based attacks and after 10 iterations it
produces blackouts with 60% of demand lost.
4.2.2 Eastern Interconnection
Figure 4.7 describes electrical risk analysis and specifically blackout sizes for the Eastern
Interconnection set of 29 subgrids. Degree based attacks produce in average blackouts with
80% of demand lost. Centrality based attacks result in slightly higher costs than random
failures, however, these two strategies do not achieve average blackout sizes larger than
50-55%. Figures 4.3,4.4 and 4.5 summarize the statistics for each one of the three strategies.
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Figure 4.6: Electrical risk analysis results for IEEE-300. Note that the random failure
data points represent 20 repetitions. Percentiles 25, 50 and 75 are plotted in the figure.
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Figure 4.7: Electrical risk analysis results for the Eastern Interconnection. Data points are
averaged over 29 subgrids. Note that the random failure data points represent 20 repetitions.
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Figure 4.8: Electrical risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Random Failures
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Figure 4.9: Electrical risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Node degree based attacks
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Figure 4.10: Electrical risk analysis results for EI subgrids - Electrical centrality based
attacks
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4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen that power grids can educe different dynamics. When measur-
ing cost as changes on the average shortest distance, the network behaves as an ER random
graphs and the results in this chapter are consistent with those reported by Albert et al.
(2000). However, when we are measuring the amount of power demand losses, the East-
ern Interconnection subgrids clearly behave as the BA scale-free model. They have a flat
response to random failures but they are fairly vulnerable to degree based attacks.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis I describe a new approach to analyzing the structure and dynamics of power
grids as complex networks. The methods described in this thesis can be used to describe
both the topology and the electrical structure of power systems using graph representations.
Results from Chapter 2 show that power grids differ substantially from existing theo-
retical graph structures, indicating that power grids cannot be fully understood with those
graph representations. In particular, we have shown that considering parameters like dis-
tance cost help build new algorithms that produce random graphs with properties similar
to those that we find in power grids.
Results in Chapter 3 incorporate information about electrical structure in order to char-
acterize power grids. In particular, we find that topological distance and electrical distances
are not strongly correlated but combining them with other electrical properties allows us to
obtain insights into the organization of power systems.
Finally, the vulnerability analysis described in Chapter 4 indicates that in topological
dynamics power grids are similar to random graphs, however a model of electrical dynamics
indicates that power grids behave more like scale free networks.
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Appendix A
IEEE-300 one line diagram
Figure A.1 shows the one-line diagram of the standard test case IEEE-300, which has been
used in this thesis to contrast the results obtained from the Eastern Interconnection data.
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Figure A.1: One-line diagram of the IEEE 300 bus network. PSTCA (2007).
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